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Abstract
In structured populations the spatial arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the interaction graph
together with the structure of the graph itself determines the game dynamics and particularly whether or
not fixation of cooperation (or defection) is favored. For a single cooperator (and a single defector) and a
network described by a regular graph the question of fixation can be addressed by a single parameter, the
structure coefficient. As this quantity is generic for any regular graph, we may call it the generic structure
coefficient. For two and more cooperators (or several defectors) fixation properties can also be assigned
by structure coefficients. These structure coefficients, however, depend on the arrangement of cooperators
and defectors which we may interpret as a configuration of the game. Moreover, the coefficients are specific
for a given interaction network modeled as regular graph, which is why we may call them specific structure
coefficients. In this paper, we study how specific structure coefficients vary over interaction graphs and
link the distributions obtained over different graphs to spectral properties of interaction networks. We
also discuss implications for the benefit–to–cost ratios of donation games.
1 Introduction
Assessing probabilities for the fixation of a strategy, given that one or several players start to use this
strategy, is a fundamental question in evolutionary game theory, [Nowak, 2006, Broom and Rychtar, 2013].
However, calculating fixation probabilities exactly in structured populations is computationally intractable,
see for example [Hindersin et al., 2016, Ibsen-Jensen et al, 2015, Voorhess, 2013]. The computational costs
increase exponentially with the number of players (and coplayers) in evolutionary (and coevolutionary)
games. Recently, [Chen et al., 2016] devised a method for calculating conditions of weak selection favor-
ing fixation that can be done in polynomial time for regular graphs. The method employs modeling the
strategies used by players and coplayers as configurations. By such a configuration–based model, conditions
that favor fixation have been studied for birth–death (BD) and death–birth (DB) updating. In another
recent work, a method for linking configurations with graph–theoretical properties of interaction networks
has been proposed which uses the framework of dynamic game landscapes, [Richter, 2016, Richter, 2017,
Richter, 2018]. Game landscapes connect co–evolutionary games with the framework of dynamic fitness land-
scapes, [Foster et al., 2013, Richter and Engelbrecht, 2014]. The method also involves modeling interaction
networks by regular graph. This paper combines these two approaches.
There is a considerable amount of work on dynamics of games with N players on d–regular graphs.
In particular, it was shown that for a game with two strategies (for instance cooperating and defecting)
and for weak selection the conditions for one strategy to be favored over the other can be described by a
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single parameter, the structure coefficient σ, [Taylor et al., 2007, Ohtsuki et al., 2006, Tarnita et al., 2009,
Allen and Nowak, 2014]. For instance, in a well-mixed population (d = N − 1) and a wide class of updating
rules, there is σ = (N−2)/N , [Traulsen et al, 2008, Antal et al., 2009], while for games on cycles (d = 2), we
find σ = (3N − 8)/N , [Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006] and for generally structured populations, low mutation,
large N and N  d, we have σ = (d + 1)/(d − 1) [Ohtsuki et al., 2006]. Generalizing these results for
population size N and any 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1, the structure coefficient σ = ((d + 1)N − 4d)/((d − 1)N)
has been obtained, [Taylor et al., 2007, Lehmann et al., 2007, Tarnita et al., 2009]. We may interpret all
these structure coefficients as generic for a given N and d and say that σ = σ(N, d) are generic structure
coefficients. They strictly apply only for a randomly–placed single cooperator (or defector).
The generic description, however, neither takes into account how for structured populations the game
dynamics may be modified by several players starting to use a certain strategy, nor considers how the
structure of the interaction network itself influences the outcome. To include these variables into the
framework of structure coefficients, [Chen et al., 2016] recently suggested structure coefficients that can
be defined for any configuration of cooperators and defectors and for any network of interaction modeled
by regular graphs. We may interpret these structure coefficients as specific for a configuration pi and an
interaction graph AI and say that σ(pi) = σ(N, d, pi,AI) are specific structure coefficients.
In this paper, we analyze the specific structure coefficients over configurations and interaction networks.
In particular, it is shown that while for configurations with a single cooperator (and a single defector) the
results reproduce those for generic coefficients, for other configurations of cooperators and defectors, the
specific structure coefficients vary over interaction networks. A frequently studied question is to what extend
different networks of interaction contribute to differences in the fixation properties of games. We approach
this question be analyzing how network properties relate to specific structure coefficients. Therefore, the
distributions obtained by these variations are studied and linked to spectral properties of the interaction
networks, thus proposing a spectral analysis of evolutionary graphs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 the main results and experimental findings are presented,
where games with N = {8, 10, 12, 14} and 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1 are considered. We focus on DB updating as BD
updating appears to be less interesting in terms of game dynamics since it never favors cooperators and is
always opposed to the emergence of cooperation. The results are discussed and possible implications are ad-
dressed in Sec. 3. Finally, in Sec. 4 methods are given and particularly coevolutionary games, configurations
and structure coefficients as well as spectral graph measures of interaction networks are reviewed.
2 Results
Fixation properties of general 2 × 2 games for any configuration pi of cooperators and defectors on any
regular graph can be determined by the structure coefficient σ(pi), see 4. Methods. Recently, is was shown
by [Chen et al., 2016] that for weak selection and DB as well as BD updating, the structure coefficient can
be calculated with time complexity O(d2N), where N is the number of players in the game (and also the
number of vertices of the interaction graph AI) and d is the number of coplayers (and also the degree of the
graph). In particular, it was shown that for DB updating we have
σ(pi) =
N (1 + 1/d)ω1 · ω0 − 2ω10 − ω1ω0
N (1− 1/d)ω1 · ω0 + ω1ω0 , (1)
which depends (apart from N and d) on four local frequencies: ω1, ω0, ω10 and ω1ω0. For these local
frequencies, the following probabilistic interpretation may be given, [Chen et al., 2016]. Suppose on a given
interaction graph AI a random walk is carried out with the starting vertex chosen uniformly–at–random.
Then the local frequency ω1 (or ω0 = 1− ω1) is the probability that for a configuration pi the player at the
first step of the walk is a cooperator (or defector). The local frequency ω10 is the probability that the player
at the first step is a cooperator and at the second step it is a defector. Finally, if we carry out two random
walks independent of each other, the local frequency ω1ω0 is the probability that the player at the first step
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Figure 1: The number #σ of different values of the structure coefficient σ(pi), Eq. (1), for players N
and coplayers 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1. The results are grouped with respect to the number of cooperators c(pi),
1 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 1 according to the color code on the right–hand side of the figures. We see that the number
of different values of the structure coefficient σ(pi) increases with N , except for d = N − 1 and that different
values are most numerous for intermediate values of d.
on the first walk is a cooperator, but a defector on the second walk. In 4. Methods the calculation of the
local frequencies is given in detail for N = 4.
For a given N and d, we may obtain varying local frequencies in Eq. (1) for each network of interaction
and possibly varying σ(pi), see also the discussion in 4. Methods. For numerical experiments we analyze N =
{8, 10, 12, 14}, 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1, and use a set of interaction networks described by d–regular graphs for which
the adjacency matrices AI are generated algorithmically, [Bayati et al., 2010, Blitzstein and Diaconis, 2011].
The number Ld(N) of different interaction networks may be very large, even for a moderate number of
players. For instance, for N = 12 players with d = 2 coplayers each, we have L2(12) = 34.944.085 different
networks, [Richter, 2017]. Thus, as it is not feasible to numerically evaluate all networks, we bound the
magnitude of the set of AI taken into account from above by G = 10.000. In case of Ld(N) < G for
any N and d considered, we take the whole set. To summarize, we analyze for each configuration pi a
set σ(pi) = (σ1(pi), σ2(pi), . . . , σI(pi)) with I = min (G,Ld(N)) for a set of adjacency matrices AI(k) with
k = 1, 2, . . . , I. The variable k can be interpreted as a temporal counter, similar to a discrete dynamical
system. Furthermore, we understand the set σ(pi) to form a distribution over adjacency matrices AI(k). Our
central questions in the analysis are. How do the structure coefficients (1) vary over interaction networks?
For what configurations pi and what number of cooperators c(pi) does variation happen? Are there interaction
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Figure 2: The normalized number #σ#c(pi)
N of different values of the structure coefficient σ(pi), Eq. (1), for
players N and coplayers 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1. The results are grouped with respect to the number of cooperators
c(pi), 1 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 1 according to the color code on the right–hand side of the figures.
networks that produces larger (or smaller) values of σ(pi) for a given configuration pi and the same N and
d? And if so, are these interaction networks also distinct with respect to spectral graph measures?
In a first series of experiments we analyze the distribution of σ(pi) over interaction networks. We count
how many different values of σ(pi) there are for a given configuration pi and interaction graph AI . This
distribution is based on ` = 2N −2 configurations for which Eq. (1) gives structure coefficients for each N , d
and AI . The values of σ(000 . . . 0) and σ(111 . . . 1) are not defined as they represent absorbing configurations.
The distributions can be grouped according to the Hamming weight (or bitcount) of a configuration pi which
equals the number of cooperators c(pi). Fig. 1 gives the number #σ of how many different values of σ(pi)
there are for each number of cooperators c(pi) over players N and coplayers d. The results show substantial
structure and symmetry over all N and d tested. To begin with, the number of different σ(pi) is countable
and the count is rather low. If every network of interaction were to produce a different value of σ(pi), the
count #σ could be as high as the number of interaction graphs tested (up to G = 10.000 according to
our experimental setup) for each configuration, but the actual results are much lower. A second property
is symmetry with respect to the number of cooperators c(pi), which follows from the symmetry under
conjugation σ(pi) = σ(1 − pi), [Chen et al., 2016]. The values of #σ generally increase with the number
of cooperators c(pi) until cooperator and defectors are exactly (or almost) balanced, before symmetrically
decreasing for c(pi) getting even larger. A third result is #σ = 1 for all c(pi) = 1 and c(pi) = N − 1. In
4
other words, the N configurations each with either only a single cooperator (and N − 1 defectors) or N − 1
cooperators (and a single defector) all produce the same σ(pi) for all AI tested. Lastly, we obtain #σ = 1
for all c(pi) and d = N − 1. This relates to the finding that for a well–mixed population there is exactly one
network of interaction which consequently produces one σ(pi). The results in Fig. 1 also show differences
over N and d. There is no real symmetry with respect to d, even if the well–mixed case d = N − 1 is
discarded. However, we obtain the largest values of #σ for intermediate values of d, that is d = {3, 4} for
N = 8, d = {4, 5} for N = 10, d = {4, 5, 6, 7} for N = 12, and d = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9} for N = 14, and lower
values for smaller and larger d. Moreover, the values of #σ generally increase with the number of players,
but if we scale the number of different values of σ(pi) with the number of configurations, the results in Fig.
1 suggest #σ
2N−2 → 0 for N getting larger. This means as N increases it becomes rare to find a configuration
pi for which σ(pi) varies over interaction networks.
An interesting aspect of the distribution of σ(pi) is variety and symmetry over the number of cooperators
c(pi), which can be analyzed by normalizing the values of #σ by N/#c(pi), see Fig. 2. The number #c(pi) of
configurations with the same number of cooperators c(pi) can be calculated as binomials: #c(pi) =
(
N
c(pi)
)
for 1 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 1. There are two results that are invariant under the number of players N . First, the
normalized number of different structure coefficients σ(pi) yields #σ#c(pi)
N = 1 for all c(pi) = 1 and c(pi) = N−1,
which follows from #1 =
(
N
1
)
= #N−1 = N . The other constant values over varying N are obtained for
c(pi) = 2 and c(pi) = N − 2. We get #σ#c(pi)N = 2 for intermediate numbers of coplayers, for which also #σ
has large values, see Fig. 1. The number of coplayers for which this can be observed follows d = N/2 − 1.
For N increasing, the value of #σ grows linearly with #c(pi) and N for c(pi) = 2 and c(pi) = N − 2. As
#2 =
(
N
2
)
= #N−2 = N(N − 1)/2, we have #σ = N − 1. For all other numbers of coplayers (except
c(pi) = {1, 2, N −2, N −1}), the number of configurations with the same number of cooperators #c(pi) grows
faster than the number of configurations with different structure coefficients, which can be seen by #σ#c(pi)
N
getting smaller and smaller for N increasing. A possible interpretation is that if we intend to find at random
a configuration pi that yields varying structure coefficients σ(pi) over interaction networks specified by AI ,
the chances are best for c(pi) = 2 or c(pi) = N − 2 cooperators and an intermediate number of coplayers d
with d ≈ N/2. Moreover, as the number of configurations with the same number of cooperators #c(pi) grows
quadratic with N for c(pi) = 2 and c(pi) = N − 2, finding this configuration by enumeration is numerically
feasible. For c(pi) ≥ 3 and c(pi) ≤ N − 3, the absolute number of configurations with varying σ(pi) increases,
but finding them becomes harder as they get rare. The number of configurations with the same c(pi), #c(pi),
grows polynomial with the degree depending on c(pi). For c(pi) = N2 , the growth is even exponential.
We next look at the shape of the distributions, see Figs. 3 and 4, which gives histograms of σ(pi) as violin
plots over the number of cooperators c(pi). The number of bins of the histograms is calculated according
to the Freedman–Diaconis rule. The central axis of the violin plots gives the range between the largest and
the smallest value of σ(pi). To show general trends of how σ(pi) is distributed over AI , Fig. 3 gives results
for N = 8 and d = {2, 3, 5, 6}, while Fig. 4 shows results for d = N2 and N = {8, 10, 12, 14}. For other
combinations of N and d, the results are similar and the properties discussed next apply likewise. A first
property is that for a given N and d the single value of σ(pi) for c(pi) = 1 and c(pi) = N − 1 reproduces the
generic σ for N and d: ([Taylor et al., 2007, Lehmann et al., 2007, Tarnita et al., 2009])
σ =
(d+ 1)N − 4d
(d− 1)N , (2)
which is shown as red line in the Figs. 3 and 4. In other words, the 2N configurations pi with Hamming weight
hw1(pi) = 1 and hw1(pi) = N − 1 are invariant over interaction networks and thus for these configurations
the specific coefficients σ(pi) of Eq. (1) reproduce the generic coefficients σ of Eq. (2). For 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N−2.
we find a distribution of values that may be both smaller and larger than σ in Eq. (2). Put differently, the
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Figure 3: Histograms of the distribution of σ(pi) over interaction networks as violin plots for different number
of cooperators c(pi) and N = 8. The red line gives the generic σ according to Eq. (2). The coefficient σ
is an intermediate value intersecting the distribution σ(pi) where different interaction networks may result
in both larger and smaller values. The largest range of σ(pi) is generally obtained for c(pi) = N/2, which
means for a balance between cooperators and defectors.
generic coefficient σ intersects the distribution of specific coefficients σ(pi).
If we compare the values over d, we notice that for increasing d the range between largest and smallest
value of the distribution slightly decreases. Generally, it can be seen that the values of σ(pi) are sparsely
distributed. Over the range between the largest and the smallest value, the values of σ(pi) only group within
a small subset. Frequently, values are very close to each other, which means they are counted within the
same bin of the histogram. In most cases do the distributions have tails where smallest and largest values
of σ(pi) have a very small frequency. A exception from this rule are the distributions for d = N − 2, see Fig.
3d for N = 8 (for the other N we get similar results), for which we find more heavy tails with smallest and
largest values of σ(pi) having a rather substantial frequency. The largest range we obtain for intermediate
values of cooperators c(pi), mostly for c(pi) = N2 . The distributions are symmetric with respect to c(pi).
For N increasing, it can be noticed that the distribution remains within a similar interval with the range
between largest and smallest value of the distribution decreases slightly. Along with the number of different
structure coefficients increasing with N , the distributions for N = {12, 14} get less sparse and assume a
more dense shape.
A second series of experiments addresses relationships between the structure coefficients σ(pi) and graph
measures of the interaction networks. As shown with Figs. 1–4, there is variety in σ(pi) over interaction
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Figure 4: Histograms of the distribution of σ(pi) over interaction networks as violin plots for different number
of cooperators c(pi) and d = N/2. The red line gives the generic σ according to Eq. (2), which is σ = 1 for
d = N/2 and all N . The range between the smallest and the largest value of the distributions gets slowly
smaller for N getting larger.
networks and it may be interesting to ask if these differences are reflected by graph–theoretical properties
of the networks. We here describe the interaction networks by instances of d–regular graphs and each graph
can be characterized by spectral graph measures, see 4. Methods. A first result is that the spectral graph
measures tested in this paper, graph energy (ene), independence number (ind), algebraic connectivity (con)
and triangle number (tri), form discrete sets where the count of different values is much lower than the
count of the set. In fact, the count for graph measures is even lower than the count for structure coefficients.
We now study how the distributions of the values over the sets relate from structure coefficients to spectral
graph measures.
Therefore, we consider σ¯(pi) = ‖σ(pi) − 〈σ(pi)〉‖, which is the distance between the distribution σ(pi)
from an average over interaction networks 〈σ(pi)〉 = 1/I∑Ii=1 σi(pi). The quantity 〈σ(pi)〉 can be interpreted
as representing an average network, which is underlined by the result that ‖〈σ(pi)〉‖ is well–related to the
generic structure coefficient σ, see Fig. 5, which shows ‖〈σ(pi)〉‖ for N = {8, 10, 12, 14} and 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1
over d and over σ calculated by Eq. (2). We see that ‖〈σ(pi)〉‖ linearly scales to σ, except for d = N − 1.
A possible visualization of the relationships between the distance σ¯(pi) and spectral graph measures is
based on schemaballs, [Krzywinski, 2004]. We again sort σ¯(pi) according to the same number of cooperators
c(pi) to obtain a distribution over interaction networks for the number of players, coplayers and cooperators,
{N, d, c(pi)}. In the schemaballs we draw Bezier curves connecting the values of the spectral graph measures
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Figure 5: The quantity ‖〈σ(pi)〉‖/2N representing an average network for N = {8, 10, 12, 14} and 2 ≤ d ≤
N − 1: a) ‖〈σ(pi)〉‖/2N versus the number of coplayers d; b) ‖〈σ(pi)〉‖/2N versus the generic structure
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d = N − 1.
of the interaction matrix AI with the values of σ¯(pi) belonging to this interaction network, see Figs. 6 and
7. The upper half of the ball gives the sorted values of the graph measure, the lower half the sorted values
of the distance measure σ¯(pi). As both the spectral graph measures as well as the distance measure σ¯ are
sparsely distributions, the gaps between values are cut out to have left over only unique values. Thus, in the
balls the values are distanced such that only unique values are placed equidistant. The curves are colored
in such a way that the same value of the graph measure has only connections of the same color. The color
are selected equidistant from a HSV color circle. As an example, Fig. 6 shows the schemaballs of σ¯ and the
spectral graph measures according to (18)–(21) for {N, d, c(pi)} = {8, 4, 3}. We see that certain values of the
graph measures imply certain distance measures σ¯(pi). For instance, in Fig. 6a showing the relation between
graph energy (18) and ¯σ(pi), we see that ene = 12.29 implies the interval 0.28 ≤ σ¯(pi) ≤ 0.31. Note that
between the spectral graph measures and the distance measure σ¯ there is generally no simple dependence
which could be expressed as a correlation implying a linear (or piece–wise linear) relationship between the
variables. For instance, the schemaball for algebraic connectivity, Fig. 6c, shows that con = 2.586 is related
to two intervals at σ¯ ≈ 0.36 and at σ¯ ≈ 0.29, but not to the intermediate interval σ¯ ≈ 0.32. In some ways,
the scale of σ¯ is fragmented, while each of the fragments is connected to a value of the graph measure. On
the other hand, between tri and σ¯ there seems to be (at least for the example of {N, d, c(pi)} = {8, 4, 3})
an almost linear relation, see Fig. 6d. Furthermore, it can be seen by comparing the schemaballs that
different spectral graph measures relate differently to the distance measure σ¯. For instance ene and tri as
well as con and ind appear to be more related than ene and con or ind and tri. Looking at the results in
the schemaballs it may be interesting to ask if there is a link to the graph–theoretical interpretation of the
spectral measures, see 4.3. Methods. For the example in Fig. 6, it can be seen that small values of the
independence number ind, which indicate a small independent set of vertices, small values of the algebraic
connectivity con, which characterize more path–like graphs with low girth, and large values of the triangular
number tri, which means a larger number of triangles in the graph, all imply large values of the distance
measure σ¯. It might be interesting to explore these links in detail in future work.
Fig. 7 shows schemaballs for N = {10, 12, 14}. In principle, we can see that the relationships between
the graph energy ene and intervals of the distance measure σ¯ can be found similarly to N = 8. Most
importantly, it seems that the substantial amount of structure in the data is preserved. However, as the
number of unique values of the related quantities increases, also the number of the intervals goes up and
also the degree of fragmentation. Clearly, for N = 14 the usefulness of schemaballs as tool for visualizing
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Figure 6: Schemaballs visualizing the relations between the distance measure σ¯ and spectral graph measures
for {N, d, c(pi)} = {8, 4, 3}. a) graph energy ene, Eq. (18), b) independence number ind, Eq. (19), c)
algebraic connectivity con, Eq. (20), d) triangular number tri, Eq. (21). We draw Bezier curves connecting
the values of the spectral graph measures of the interaction matrix AI with the values of the distance
measure σ¯(pi) belonging to this interaction network. The curves are colored in such a way that the same
value of the graph measure has only connections of the same color. We see that each value of the spectral
graph measures is connected to an interval of the distance measure, but the connection are not linear.
the relationships approaches its limits.
To go beyond visualization we need a measures of the strength of the relationships between structure co-
efficients and spectral graphs measures. As argued using the schemaballs in Figs. 6 and 7, most likely there
are no linear or piece–wise linear relationships which excludes correlation coefficients mostly accounting for
the strength of linear relationships. Therefore, we measure the strength of the relationships by normalized
mutual information (MI), [Cover and Thomas, 1991], between the distribution σ¯ and distributions of the
graph measures graph energy ene and independence number ind. Roughly speaking, mutual information
of two series measures the amount of information that can be obtained from one through the other, see,
e.g. [Mishra and Pandey, 2012, Nemzer, 2017] for application in biological sciences. Thus, mutual infor-
mation can be interpreted as a generalized measure of the dependency which does not assume any specific
algebraic form of the relationship. The mutual information considered here is normalize to the interval [0, 1].
Similarly to correlation coefficients, MI = 0 means that the data sets tested are statistically independent.
The normalized mutual information MI(σ¯, ene) and MI(σ¯, ind) of the distance measure σ¯ and the spectral
graph measures is given in Figs. 8 and 9. Only for 3 ≤ d ≤ N−3 we get MI > 0, as for d = 1 and d = N−1,
there is only one value of σ(pi) and thus also only one value of σ¯, while for d = 2 and d = N − 2 the
spectral graph measures considered here have the same value for all 2–regular and (N − 2)–regular graphs.
Also, for c(pi) = 1 and c(pi) = N − 1, the mutual information MI = 0, as for a single cooperator (and a
single defector), there is no variance in σ¯ over interaction networks. The results for the remaining d and
c(pi) show that σ¯ and {ene, ind} have a considerable degree of dependency, which increases with N . For
N = 14 we have almost the maximal value of MI = 1. Also, there are just small differences over the number
of cooperators c(pi) (except N = 8), which confirms results obtained by visually inspecting the schemaball
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Figure 7: Schemaballs for N = {10, 12, 14}, which also show connections between the distance measure
σ¯ and graph energy ene similar to N = 8 in Fig. 6, but the number of intervals and the fragmentation
increases.
in Figs. 6 and 7. Also, it can be seen that the dependency by mutual information is not very different
from graph energy to independence number (again except n = 8), which similarly can also be obtained if
considering the other two spectral graph measures {con, tri}. The results in Figs. 8 and 9 show clearly that
there are strong relationships between the structure coefficients obtained for different interaction networks
and spectral graph measure of these networks.
3 Discussion
In [Chen et al., 2016] is was shown that for 2 × 2 games with N players on d–regular graphs with payoff
matrix (6) strategy C is favored over D if
σ(pi) >
c− b
a− d. (3)
The condition (3) generalizes the same condition with σ(pi) = σ = (d+1)N−4d(d−1)N , which applies to a single
cooperator (and a single defector), [Taylor et al., 2007, Lehmann et al., 2007, Tarnita et al., 2009]. It is
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Figure 8: Normalized mutual information between the distance measure σ¯ and graph energy ene for N and
3 ≤ d ≤ N − 3 and 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 2. We generally see high values of MI(σ¯, ene) which indicate a strong
dependency between the quantities. A major exception is N = 8, but also for d = N − 3 the dependency is
weaker.
now valid for any configuration pi of cooperators and defectors and for any interaction network modeled by
a d–regular graph.
In 2. Results experimental findings are reported showing that and how the structure coefficients σ(pi)
vary over interaction networks AI . It is further demonstrated that the variability of the structure coefficients
can be linked to varying values of spectral graph measures obtained for the interaction networks. Thus, if
we were to insert into Eq. (3) the distributions over interaction networks of σ(pi) as discussed above, we
may obtain different ratios c−ba−d that satisfy the condition (3). This explains how different parametrizations
of the payoff matrix (6) may produce different game dynamics (and possibly varying fixation properties) for
the same structure coefficient, that is for the same arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the same
evolutionary graph. To give an example of this effect, consider the donation game (also simplified Prisoner’s
Dilemma), which is a special case of the payoff matrix (6) with
( Cj Dj
Ci b− c −c
Di b 0
)
, (4)
where b is interpreted as benefit and c as cost, [Allen and Nowak, 2014, Shakarian et al., 2012]. For the dona-
tion game, the condition (3) simplifies to the critical benefit–to–cost ratio, [Taylor et al., 2007, Tarnita et al., 2009,
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Figure 9: Normalized mutual information between the distance measure σ¯ and independence number ind for
N and 3 ≤ d ≤ N − 3 and 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 2. We also see rather high values of MI(σ¯, ind). The exceptions
found for MI(σ¯, ene) apply likewise.
Chen et al., 2016] (
b
c
)∗
=
σ(pi) + 1
σ(pi)− 1 . (5)
Condition (5) implies that properties of the distribution of the structure coefficients over interaction networks
and the relationships between the structure coefficients and graph measures can be immediately transferred
to benefit–to–cost ratios. From condition (5) we further see that if σ(pi) > 1, cooperation is favored as
benefit exceeds cost. If σ(pi) = 1, then
(
b
c
)∗ → ∞, which means cooperation cannot be favored, while for
σ < 1, we have a spite game in which player pay cost to harm another. The experimental findings given
above show that there are cases where it depends on the interaction network and the configuration whether
we have σ(pi) > 1 or σ(pi) = 1 or σ(pi) < 1, even if the number of cooperators is the same. See for instance
Fig. 4 which shows this result for d = N/2 and any number of cooperators c(pi) with 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 2.
This observation leads to the question of an optimal configuration and/or an optimal interaction network.
For a donation game optimal means best promotion of cooperation, which is for a minimized critical benefit–
to–cost ratio (5), or a maximized σ(pi). An interesting result of the numerical finding reported above is that
there is not an optimal configuration or an optimal network, but there are combinations of configuration
and network that are better than others. In other words, the question of optimality cannot be answered for
configurations independent from networks, and vice versa. To illustrate this point, let us take another look
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Figure 10: a) Schemaball for graph energy and the structure coefficient σ(pi), which combines the schemaball
in Fig. 6a with the violin plot in Fig. 4a, each for N = 8, d = 4 and c(pi) = 3. The structure coefficient σ(pi)
has values 0.9394 ≤ σ(pi) ≤ 1.1180, but unlike the results in Fig. 6a, all graph measures ene are connected
to all unique values of σ(pi), except ene = 8 is only connected to σ(pi) = 1. Note that the 11 values of σ(pi)
in the lower half of the schemaball correspond to #σ = 11 in Fig. 1a for d = 4 and c(pi) = 3. b) The sign of
the distance to σ(pi) = 1 as different colors over configurations and graph energy, also for N = 8 and d = 4.
The configurations are sorted according to the number of cooperators c(pi), while the graph measure ene
is sorted according to unique values of ene. There is a kind of tricolor “Cantorian dust” with intermixed
all three signs of the distance to σ(pi) = 1 for almost all fields of same graph energy and same number of
cooperators.
at the findings given above showing the distributions of σ(pi) over interaction networks, see Fig. 10. Fig.
10a shows a schemaball as in Figs. 6 and 7 for N = 8, d = 4 and c(pi) = 3, but with the distribution of
the structure coefficient σ(pi) instead of the distance σ¯. In fact, Fig. 10a combines the schemaball in Fig.
6a with the violin plot in Fig. 4a, each for N = 8 and d = 4. The structure coefficient σ(pi) has values
0.9394 ≤ σ(pi) ≤ 1.1180, but unlike the results in Fig. 6a, all graph measures ene are connected to all unique
values of σ(pi), except for ene = 8 which is only connected to σ(pi) = 1. This result is general for all tested
d and AI with N = {8, 10, 12, 14}. Certain values of the graph energy (or any of the other spectral graph
measures tested) of an interaction network alone do not specify a structure coefficient σ(pi) and thus game
dynamics and fixation properties.
To explore this point a little further, see the results in Fig. 10b, which shows the sign of the distance
to σ(pi) = 1, (σ(pi) < 1, σ(pi) = 1, σ(pi) > 1) as different colors over configurations and graph measures,
again for N = 8 and d = 4. The configurations are sorted according to the number of cooperators c(pi),
while the graph measure ene is sorted according to unique values of ene. As there are 7 different numbers
of cooperators c(pi) with N = 8 players (c(pi) = 0 and c(pi) = 8 are absorbing) and 6 different values of ene,
we get 42 different fields in Fig. 10b. (However, only 5 different value of ene are clearly visible as ene = 8
is only a tiny portion with 19 out of the 10.000 tested networks.) There are two main observations to be
made. A first is that for every field (except c(pi) = 1 and c(pi) = 7, which is for a single cooperator and
a single defector), there is a kind of tricolor “Cantorian dust” with intermixed σ(pi) < 1, σ(pi) = 1 and
σ(pi) > 1. The other observation is that the mix is not always the same. There are at least some fields
with more values σ(pi) < 1, for instance c(pi) = 4 and ene = 13.66 or more values of σ = 1, for instance
c(pi) = 3 and c(pi) = 5 and ene = 10.47, and so on. Similar results as in Fig. 10b can be obtained for
other combinations of N and d as well. However, only for d = N/2 the critical value σ(pi) = 1 coincides
with the generic structure coefficient σ according to Eq. (2), which intersects the distribution of σ(pi) over
interaction networks. Thus, to obtain the “Cantorian dust” as in Fig. 10b, the sign of the distance should
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be calculated against the threshold σ(pi) = σ. Admittedly, as σ > 0 for d < N/2 and σ > 1 for d > N/2,
contrary to d = N/2 such an image would therefore not directly be related to the critical benefit–to–cost
ratio. All these findings once again support that game dynamics and fixation is generally defined by the
interplay of configuration and properties of the interaction network. For interaction networks modeled as
d–regular graphs the relevant network properties can be expressed as spectral graph measures, which may
open up spectral analysis of evolutionary graphs.
Closely related to optimality is the design problem which addresses the question of which configuration
and which network of interaction should be taken to promote certain fixation properties, for instance the
emergence of cooperation. As configurations describe on which vertices of the evolutionary graph there are
cooperators and defectors, this question can be answered by an optimal initial configurations, from which
the game starts. Again, designing the initial configuration cannot be undertaken without designing the
interaction network. In both cases, doing so by enumeration is only possible for a small number of players.
Even then we could only be sure to have the “optimal configuration” if we checked all ` = 2N possible
configurations. In contrast, whether or not we have found the “optimal network” is far from being clear,
even for the rather small number of players N = {8, 10, 12, 14} as considered here. It is not yet known how
many different d–regular graphs on N vertices there are for a given N and 3 ≤ d ≤ N − 2. There is an
asymptotic approximation for the total number of d–regular graphs Ld(N) that assigns for d = o(
√
N) and
dN even a magnitude Ld(N) = O(NN ), which is rather huge, [Wormald, 1999, Richter, 2017]. The number
of different interaction networks grows even faster than the number of configurations. On the other hand,
the results given above also show that for N getting large, the range of the distribution over interaction
networks gets smaller, shrinking to σ for N →∞. Thus, the design problem appears to be most interesting
for intermediate values of N such that with some likelihood a numerical treatment might remain feasible.
Moreover, the results given in this paper suggest another approach to the design problem. At least for
N = {8, 10, 12, 14}, interaction networks with certain spectral graph measures propose to lead to network–
and–configuration pairs with enhanced likelihood for certain structure coefficients. Thus, we may potentially
prescribe interaction networks with particular spectral graph measures and hence reduce the design space of
interaction networks. Naturally, this would require a better understanding of the relationships between the
structure coefficients σ(pi), the distance measure σ¯ and the spectral graph measures. Mutual information
has shown to be sufficient to establish that there are strong relationships and hence it seems reasonable
that by more sophisticated methods a more precise description of the relationships could be obtained, for
instance by nonlinear statistical models or machine learning algorithms. Also, the conclusions given rely
upon the assumption that the set of interaction networks tested represents well all existing interaction
networks with given N and d. To question this assumption experiments with smaller subsets of the set of
up to G = 10.000 different interaction networks have been carried out. The results obtained for the smaller
subsets are consistent with the results for the whole set, which may be seen as an argument in favor of the
assumption. However, if these results hold for N > 14 needs to be addressed by future work.
Calculating structure coefficients by Eq. (1) is for regular graphs and all conclusions drawn from this
method are as well. A final remark can be made about how the framework presented may be a staring
point for going beyond regular graphs. Recently, [Allen et al., 2017] proposed a method to calculate the
benefit–to–cost ratios for any population structure based on coalescence times of random walks, which can
be done for any graph structure. The simulation results show a substantial degree of variety in the ratios and
it could be interesting to see if this variety stems from similar relationships to spectral graph measures as
those reported here. If so, further understanding could be reached about how network properties contribute
to differences in the fixation properties of games.
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4 Methods
4.1 Coevolutionary games and configurations
Coevolutionary games of N players can be described by: (i) the payoff matrix, (ii) the interaction net-
work, and (iii) the strategy of each player, [Szabo and Fath, 2007, Perc and Szolnoki, 2010, Richter, 2016,
Richter, 2017]. We assume the game dynamics be caused by both updating the interaction network and up-
dating the strategies. The former is meant to imply dynamic interaction graphs, while for the latter there is
a rule for updating strategies, see e.g. [Allen and Nowak, 2014, Shakarian et al., 2012, Pattni et al., 2015],
for instance death–birth (DB) or birth–death (BD) updating. As both the interaction network and the
strategies may change, the game is called coevolutionary. For a game with two strategies C and D, and
pairwise interactions between two players Ii and Ij (which consequently are mutual coplayers), there is the
2× 2 payoff matrix (Cj Dj
Ci a b
Di c d
)
. (6)
We understand a player that uses strategy Ci (or Di) to be a cooperator (or defector). In fact, payoff matrix
(6) may apply to any two strategies (say Ai and Bi). However, as variability of the elements of (6) is not
our topic here, cooperate and defect will suffice.
The interaction network of the coevolutionary game specifies who–plays–whom. According to evolution-
ary graph theory ([Lieberman et al., 2005, Allen and Nowak, 2014, Shakarian et al., 2012, Ohtsuki et al., 2007,
Pattni et al., 2015]), each player Ii belongs to a vertex i of an interaction graph, while an edge connecting
vertex i and vertex j shows that the players Ii and Ij are mutual coplayers. Algebraically, an interaction
graph is specified by the adjacency matrix AI ∈ [o, 1]N×N . The interaction graph having an edge between
vertex i and vertex j equals the matrix AI having an element aij = 1, while aij = o shows that the play-
ers Ii and Ij are no coplayers. In this paper, we consider interaction networks in which each player has
the same number of coplayers. Thus, the interaction network can be described by a random d–regular
graph, [Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015, Richter, 2016, Richter, 2017]. There are Ld(N) different instances of
d–regular graphs on N vertices that can serve as interaction networks for N players with d coplayers, thus
offering to study the effect of changing the setting as to who–plays–whom. Furthermore, there are fast and
efficient algorithms available for generating such graphs, [Bayati et al., 2010, Blitzstein and Diaconis, 2011].
As d–regular graphs with N vertices have dN/2 edges, they are only defined for dN even. In the experiments
we set N even to have graphs for all 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1.
The strategy vector pi(k) comprises the N strategies pii(k) that players may select and execute in a given
round k of the game. The strategy vector can be understood as a configuration of the game, [Chen, 2013,
Chen et al., 2016, Richter, 2016, Richter, 2017]. A configuration stands for the spatial arrangement of co-
operators and defectors on the interaction graph. For any finite number of players there is a finite number
of configurations. For a game with two strategies, there are ` = 2N configurations, which equals the num-
ber of words with length N over a two–letter alphabet A, for instance the strategies cooperate and defect
A = {Ci, Di}, for which we use the binary code A = {1, 0}. Consider the example of N = 4 players. There
are 24 = 16 configurations. For instance, the configuration pi = (pi1pi2pi3pi4) = (0110) means that players
I2 and I3 cooperate, while I1 and I4 defect. To see how many players cooperate, we count how often the
symbol 1 appears in the string pi, which is known as Hamming weight (also bitcount) hw1(pi). For instance,
hw1(0110) = 2.
4.2 Structure coefficients and local frequencies
Whether or not weak selection favors the fixation of a strategy Ci over Di from A = {Ci, Di} = {1, 0} in a
game described by the payoff matrix (6) can be expressed by the condition
σ(pi)(a− d) + (b− c) > 0 (7)
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Table 1: Calculation of the local frequencies ω1, ω0, ω10 and ω1ω0 for N = 4, d = 3 (well–mixed population),
d = 2 (structured population). There are ` = 24 = 16 configurations with the number of cooperators c(pi).
We have the number of configurations with the same number of coplayers #c(pi) = (#0,#1,#2,#3,#4) =
(1, 4, 6, 4, 1), which are the binomials #c(pi) =
4!
c(pi)!(4−c(pi))! . The local frequencies ω
1 and ω0 are characteristic
for a configuration pi and remain invariant over the number of coplayers (d = 2 and d = 3) and over different
interaction networks AI . For the structured population (d = 2), however, there is variety in ω10 and ω1ω0
over interaction networks. For instance, consider the configuration pi = (1100). For AI(1) and according to
Eq. (10), we obtain ω11 = hw1 ((1100) ◦ (oo11)) /2 = ω12 = 0 and ω13 = hw1 ((1100) ◦ (11oo)) /2 = ω14 = 1,
while for AI(2), there is ω
1
1 = hw1 ((1100) ◦ (o11o)) /2 = ω14 = 1/2 and ω12 = hw1 ((1100) ◦ (1oo1)) /2 =
ω13 = 1/2. Likewise, ω
0
1 = ω
0
2 = 1 and ω
0
3 = ω
0
4 = 0 for AI(1), but ω
0
1 = ω
0
2 = ω
0
3 = ω
0
4 = 1/2 for AI(2).
Thus, ω1 = ω0 = 1/2 for both AI(1) and AI(2), but ω1ω0 = 0 for AI(1) and ω1ω0 = 1/4 for AI(2). For
variety in ω10, see Fig. 11.
AI(0) AI(1) AI(2) AI(3)
= = = =(
o 1 1 1
1 o 1 1
1 1 o 1
1 1 1 o
) (
o o 1 1
o o 1 1
1 1 o o
1 1 o o
) (
o 1 1 o
1 o o 1
1 o o 1
o 1 1 o
) (
o 1 o 1
1 o 1 o
o 1 o 1
1 o 1 o
)
d = 3 d = 2 d = 2 d = 2
pi c(pi) ω1 ω0 ω10 ω1ω0 ω10 ω1ω0 ω10 ω1ω0 ω10 ω1ω0
0000 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1000 1 1/4 3/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
0100 1 1/4 3/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
1100 2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2/9 1/2 0 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
0010 1 1/4 3/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
1010 2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2/9 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/2 0
0110 2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2/9 1/4 1/4 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
1110 3 3/4 1/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
0001 1 1/4 3/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
1001 2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2/9 1/4 1/4 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
0101 2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2/9 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/2 0
1101 3 3/4 1/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
0011 2 1/2 1/2 1/3 2/9 1/2 0 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
1011 3 3/4 1/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
0111 3 3/4 1/4 1/4 1/6 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/4 1/8
1111 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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where σ(pi) is the structure coefficient of configuration pi, [Nowak et al., 2010, Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006,
Traulsen et al, 2008, Antal et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2016]. For any N , 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1, and for a single
cooperator (and a single defector) the structure coefficient σ(pi) does not depend on the actual configuration
and can be calculated as ([Taylor et al., 2007, Lehmann et al., 2007, Tarnita et al., 2009]):
σ =
(d+ 1)N − 4d
(d− 1)N . (8)
In [Chen et al., 2016] an explicit formula for calculating the structure coefficient has been derived from
local frequencies for both DB and BD updating, any configuration and any interaction network described
by d–regular graphs. We here focus on DB updating as BD updating always opposes the emergence of
cooperation. For DB updating the structure coefficient is
σ(pi) =
N (1 + 1/d)ω1 · ω0 − 2ω10 − ω1ω0
N (1− 1/d)ω1 · ω0 + ω1ω0 . (9)
The four local frequencies in Eq. (9), ω1, ω0, ω10 and ω1ω0, can be interpreted probabilistically considering
random walks on the interaction graph. According to this interpretation, the local frequency ω1 (or ω0 = 1−
ω1) is the probability that starting from a vertex chosen uniformly–at–random and for a given configuration
pi, the player at the first step of the walk is a cooperator (or defector). Moreover, ω10 is the probability for a
cooperator at the first step and a defector at the second, and ω1ω0 assumes two random walks independent
of each other and assigns the probability that the player at the first step is a cooperator of the first walk,
but a defector of the second. As pointed out above Eq. (9) reproduces Eq. (8) for the 2N configurations pi
with hw1(pi) = 1 and hw1(pi) = N − 1
The local frequencies in Eq. (9) are defined as follows, [Chen et al., 2016]. For every player Ii, all
configurations pi and a given network of interaction described by AI , there are local frequencies that the
coplayers cooperate ω1i (pi) or defect ω
0
i (pi). We define ω
1
i (pi) (ω
0
i (pi)) by the fraction of cooperators (defectors)
among the coplayers that a player Ii has in configuration pi. To calculate these quantities, we take the
element–wise product pi ◦ A(i)I of configuration pi and i–th row of the adjacency matrix A(i)I , observe 1o =
0o = o and have
ω1i (pi) =
hw1
(
pi ◦A(i)I
)
d
(10)
where hw1 is the Hamming weight of a string. For ω
0
i (pi) we take the Hamming weight hw0 counting the
number of 0 symbols. Both Hamming weight discard the o symbol, which indicates no edge in the adjacency
matrix AI . Consider N = 4 players with d = 2 coplayers. The network of interaction is described by a
2–regular graph on 4 vertices with L2(4) = 3 instances:
AI(1) =
(
o 1 1 o
1 o o 1
1 o o 1
o 1 1 o
)
AI(1) =
(
o o 1 1
o o 1 1
1 1 o o
1 1 o o
)
AI(3) =
(
o 1 o 1
1 o 1 o
o 1 o 1
1 o 1 o
)
. (11)
For the configuration pi = (1110), player I1 and AI(1), we get (1100) ◦ (o11o) = (o10o) which gives ω11(pi) =
ω01(pi) = 1/4.
Similarly, we may define by ω10i (pi) the fraction of paths with length 2 such that for a configuration pi
and a player Ii there is a cooperator followed by a defector on this path of the interaction network AI . To
obtain the frequencies in Eq. (9), ω1i (pi), ω
0
i (pi) and ω
10
i (pi) are finally averaged over players:
ω1(pi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ω1i (pi), (12)
ω0(pi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ω0i (pi), (13)
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Figure 11: Calculation of the local frequencies ω10 for N = 4 and d = 2 with L2(4) = 3 possible networks
of interaction. Each of them is a circle. As there are 1/d2 paths of length 2 for each vertex in a d–regular
graphs, for each player we need to check 4 path where a cooperator (pii = 1) is followed by a defector
(pij = 0), thus the property (10). For all these networks the configuration is pi = (1100), which means that
the players I1 and I2 cooperate (pi1 = pi2 = 1) and the players I3 and I4 defect (pi3 = pi4 = 0). For (a),
we find no path of length 2 and property (10) for players I1 and I2 (ω101 = ω102 = 0), but 4 paths each for
players I3 and I4: (I3 → I1 → I3), (I3 → I1 → I4), (I3 → I2 → I3), (I3 → I2 → I4) and (I4 → I1 → I3),
(I4 → I1 → I4), (I4 → I2 → I3), (I4 → I2 → I4). Thus, ω103 = ω104 = 1 and ω10(1100) = 1/2. For (b),
player I1 has only 1 path (I1 → I2 → I4) out of 4 with the property that a cooperator is followed by a
defector (10), from which we get ω101 = 1/4. This is the same for the remaining players. For player I2,
the path is (I2 → I1 → I3), for I3, it is (I3 → I1 → I3), and for I4, there is (I4 → I2 → I4). Thus,
ω102 = ω
10
3 = ω
10
4 = 1/4 and ω
10(1100) = 1/4. We may finally check that for (c), we have the same local
frequencies as for (b), and also ω10(1100) = 1/4.
ω1ω0(pi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ω1i (pi) · ω0i (pi), (14)
ω10(pi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ω10i (pi). (15)
Tab. 1 and Fig. 11 exemplify the calculating of the local frequencies (12)–(15) for N = 4 and d = {2, 3}.
The results show some features that can be observed for all tested N , d and AI and may be assumed to
apply generally. The quantity ω1 (and ω0 = 1−ω1) is characteristic for a configuration pi and invariant over
networks of interaction specified by regular graphs. By contrast, for the same configuration the frequencies
ω10 and ω1ω0 may vary over interaction networks. For instance, for the configuration pi = (1100), there is
ω10(1100) = 1/4 and ω1ω0(1100) = 1/4 for AI(2) and AI(3), but ω10(1100) = 1/2 and ω1ω0(1100) = 0 for
AI(1).
If we calculate the structure coefficients σ(pi) according to Eq. (9) from the local frequencies in Tab. 1
for N = 4 and d = {2, 3}, we obtain that all σ(pi) are the same for all configurations, except that σ(0000)
and σ(1111) are not defined as the denominator in Eq. (9) is zero and these configurations are absorbing.
We get σ(pi) = 1/2 for d = 3 and σ(pi) = 1 for d = 2, which reproduces the generic value of σ in Eq. (8). For
N ≥ 5, the values of σ(pi) may vary from σ and give a distribution over interaction networks. In 2. Results,
a numerical analysis is given for N = {8, 10, 12, 14} and 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1.
4.3 Spectral graph measures of interaction networks
As discussed above, the local frequencies ω1(pi) and ω0(pi) remain invariant over interaction graphs, while
ω10(pi) and ω1ω0(pi) may vary. In other words, a varying structure of the interaction graph specifies varying
frequencies, which is underlined by the fact that they can be calculated directly from configuration pi and
adjacency matrix AI , [Chen et al., 2016]. Therefore, the conjugate configuration pˆi is defined by pˆi = 1− pi.
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For instance, for pi = (1100), there is pˆi = 1− (1100) = (0011). We then obtain
ω10(pi) =
1
dN
piTAI pˆi (16)
and
ω1ω0(pi) =
1
d2N
piTA2I pˆi. (17)
Thus, if different AI may result in different ω10(pi) and ω1ω0(pi) (and subsequently leading to possibly
varying structure coefficients σ(pi) as well) for the same configuration pi, there could be quantifiers of the
interaction graph that reflect these differences. This approach may open up a spectral analysis of interaction
networks of co–evolutionary games.
Spectral graph theory defines several quantifiers which capture relationships between the algebraic de-
scription of a graph and its structural properties; see for instance [Brouwer and Haemers, 2012, Li et al., 2012,
Spielman, 2009]. By such a quantification structural differences of the interaction graph are mapped to dif-
ferent values of graph–spectral invariants. Two quantities considered here are based on the spectra of the
adjacency matrix: eig(AI) = (α1, α2, . . . , αN ). For connected d–regular graphs, the spectra is real and can
be sorted: −d ≤ α1 ≤ α2 ≤ . . . ≤ αN ≤ d. A first quantity is the (normalized) energy of a graph
ene =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|αi|. (18)
It can be interpreted as the spectral distance between a given graph and an empty graph and as scaling to
the degree of difference between graphs. A second spectral network measure is the independence number
ind =
−Nα1
d− α1 , (19)
which approximates the size of the largest independent set of vertices in a graph. An independent set is a
set of vertices in a graph such that no two vertices of the set are connected by a edge.
A spectral measure based on the Laplacian matrix L = dI − AI derives from the eigenvalues eig(L) =
(λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ), which are non–negative and sorted according to 0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λN . The smallest
eigenvalue of L larger than zeros, λ2, is known as (normalized) algebraic connectivity
con =
λ2
λN
, (20)
and scales to how well a graph is connected. Connectivity describes the structural property of a graph
that removing vertices or edges disconnects the graph. The Laplacian eigenvalue λ2 = 0 if the graph is
not connected, and λ2 = N if the graph is complete (that is fully connected). Larger values of λ2 indicate
graphs with a rounder shape, high connectivity and high girth, while for smaller values of λ2 the graph is
more path–like with low connectivity and low girth. Finally, we consider the triangular number
tri =
1
6
tr
(
A3I
)
, (21)
which is calculated from the trace of matrix A3I and gives the number of triangles in a graph.
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